Why Isn’t Europe Growing As Fast As the US?\textsuperscript{1}

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October 3, 2006

\textsuperscript{1}This paper borrows unrestrainedly from Aghion-Howitt’s (2006) Schumpeter Lecture.
1 Introduction

Why do we observe persistently slow growth in the EU (less than 2% a year against 3% in the US between 1995 and 2006)? Disappointingly, classical growth models do not have much to tell us on this question. The neoclassical growth model would try to explain the lower growth rate in Europe by comparing its capital-labor ratio with that of the US. True, this ratio appear to be higher in Europe, but this has been the case for more than one decade and even during times where per capita GDP in Europe was growing either faster than or at the same rate as in the US. Also, at first sight the standard textbook innovation-based model(s) cannot account for the recent growth gap between Europe and the US, given that the property rights and innovation subsidies stressed by these models are reasonably well established in Europe, and that Europe invests almost as large a fraction of GDP on R&D as the US (2% versus 2.5%). Moreover, these models do not seem to explain why European labor productivity growth was much higher than US growth during the sixties and seventies (3.5% versus 1.4% on average during the 1970s), given that R&D investments were higher in the US than Europe throughout this period.

After such a disappointing search for textbook recipes, one alternative is to turn directly to policy specialists. In particular, one may look at Dani Rodrik’s chapter on “Growth Strategies” or at Bill Easterly’s chapter on “National Policies and Economic Growth: A Reappraisal”, both written for the forthcoming Handbook of Economic Growth. In Dani Rodrik’s chapter there is the important insight that “first-order economic principles (such as) protection of property rights...(and)...appropriate incentives...do not map into unique policy packages”. One also learns that the policy challenge is not only to initiate growth, but then to sustain it over the long run. However the chapter does not provide theoretical guidelines when it comes to choosing the policy package that would be most appropriate for each particular country, the policy maker is advised to take a case-by-case approach and rely primarily on her instincts and common sense. Bill Easterly’s chapter gives more of a chance to theory, and more specifically on the AK approach. However, when going from theory to the empirics, Easterly finds that once one excludes the big outliers from cross-country regressions, one finds no significant effect of policy on growth. Very bad policies are detrimental to growth, and these in turn are those likely to result from bad institutions, thus all that matters at the end is the existence of sound basic institutions. But those already exist in Europe and yet the productivity gap between Europe and the US keeps on widening.

In this paper, we argue that Schumpeterian theory in which growth results from quality-improving innovations, provides such a paradigm and can be developed into a theory of the policy of growth. Unlike the other endogenous growth models, the Schumpeterian paradigm provides a way to “systematize” the case-by-case approach advocated by Rodrik, by pointing at key economic variables such as the country’s distance to the technological frontier or its degree of financial development, that should affect the design of structural and macroeconomic policies aimed at fostering growth.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief presentation of the Schumpeterian framework, and contrasts it with Romer’s product variety model. The following sections discusses three areas in which good policy can make a difference for growth in Europe. Section 3 focuses on competition and entry, and in particular explains why Europe would benefit from a competition and labor market policy that does not only emphasize competition among incumbent firms, but also stresses the importance of entry, exit and mobility. Section 4 analyzes education, and argues that growth in Europe would benefit from devoting more resources to post-graduate education. Section 5 discusses the role and design of budgetary policies over the business cycle and argues that growth in the Euro zone would benefit from moving towards more countercyclical budgetary policies.
2 EU versus US growth in light of the Schumpeterian paradigm

The Schumpeterian growth paradigm (see Aghion-Howitt (1992, 1998)) grew out of modern industrial organization theory, and focuses on quality improving innovations that render old products obsolete, and hence involves the force that Schumpeter called “creative destruction.” In this paper we argue that this paradigm holds the best promise of delivering a systematic, integrated, and yet operational framework for analyzing and developing context-dependent growth policies, of the kind that can help putting a region like Europe back on a high growth path, whereas the AK and the product variety paradigms fail to fully deliver on those promises.

Schumpeterian growth theory begins with a production function specified at the industry level:

$$Y_{it} = A_{it}^{1-\alpha} K_{it}^{\alpha}, \quad 0 < \alpha < 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)$$

where $A_{it}$ is a productivity parameter attached to the most recent technology used in industry $i$ at time $t$. In this equation, $K_{it}$ represents the flow of a unique intermediate product used in this sector, each unit of which is produced one-for-one by capital. Aggregate output is just the sum of the industry-specific outputs $Y_{it}$.

Each intermediate product is produced and sold exclusively by the most recent innovator. A successful innovator in sector $i$ improves the technology parameter $A_{it}$ and is thus able to displace the previous innovator as the incumbent intermediate monopolist in that sector, until displaced by the next innovator. Thus the first key implication that distinguishes the Schumpeterian Paradigm from the AK and product-variety models is that faster growth generally entails a higher rate of firm turnover, because this process of creative destruction generates entry of new innovators and exit of former innovators.

Although the theory focuses on individual industries and explicitly analyzes the microeconomics of industrial competition, the assumption that all industries are ex ante identical gives it a simple aggregate structure. In particular, it is easily shown that aggregate output depends on the aggregate capital stock $K_t$ according to the Cobb-Douglas aggregate per-worker production function:

$$Y_t = A_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)$$

where the labor-augmenting productivity factor $A_t$ is just the unweighted sum of the sector-specific $A_{it}$’s. As in neoclassical theory, the economy’s long-run growth rate is given by the growth rate of $A_t$, which here depends endogenously on the economy-wide rate of innovation.

There are two main inputs to innovation; namely the private expenditures made by the prospective innovator, and the stock of innovations that have already been made by past innovators. The latter input constitutes the publicly available stock of knowledge to which current innovators are hoping to add. The theory is quite flexible in modeling the contribution of past innovations. It encompasses the case of an innovation that leapfrogs the best technology available before the innovation, resulting in a new technology parameter $A_{it}$ in the innovating sector $i$, which is some multiple $\gamma$ of its pre-existing value. And it also encompasses the case of an innovation that catches up to a global technology frontier $\bar{A}_t$ which we typically take to represent the stock of global technological knowledge available to innovators in all sectors of all countries. In the former case the country is making a leading-edge innovation that builds on and improves the leading-edge technology in its industry. In the latter case the innovation is just implementing technologies
that have been developed elsewhere.\footnote{This flexibility of the Schumpeterian framework, does not lead to a theory in which anything can happen. For example, in the next section we discuss competition and entry. As shown in Aghion et al (2005a), the effect of competition on growth in the Schumpeterian paradigm is either monotonic or inverted-U shaped, but cannot be of any other form. Similarly, the effect of entry at the frontier on productivity growth is always more (and not less) positive in sectors initially closer to the frontier.}

For example, consider a country in which in any sector leading-edge innovations take place at the frequency $\mu_n$ and implementation innovations take place at the frequency $\mu_m$. Then the change in the economy’s aggregate productivity parameter $A_t$ will be:

$$A_{t+1} - A_t = \mu_n (\gamma - 1) A_t + \mu_m \left( \overline{A}_t - A_t \right)$$

and hence the growth rate will be:

$$g_t = \frac{A_{t+1} - A_t}{A_t} = \mu_n (\gamma - 1) + \mu_m \left( a_t^{-1} - 1 \right)$$

(3)

where:

$$a_t = A_t / \overline{A}_t$$

is an inverse measure of “distance to the frontier.”

Thus, by taking into account that innovations can interact with each other in different ways in different countries Schumpeterian theory provides a framework in which the growth effects of various policies are highly context-dependent. In particular, the Schumpeterian apparatus is well suited to analyze how a country’s growth performance will vary with its proximity to the technological frontier $a_t$, to what extent the country will tend to converge to that frontier, and what kinds of policy changes are needed to sustain convergence as the country approaches the frontier.

We could take as given the critical innovation frequencies $\mu_m$ and $\mu_n$ that determine a country’s growth path as given, just as neoclassical theory often takes the critical saving rate $s$ as given. However, Schumpeterian theory goes deeper by deriving these innovation frequencies endogenously from the profit-maximization problem facing a prospective innovator, just as the Ramsey model endogeneizes $s$ by deriving it from household utility maximization. This maximization problem and its solution will typically depend upon institutional characteristics of the economy such as property rights protection and the financial system, and also upon government policy; moreover, the equilibrium intensity and mix of innovation will often depend upon institutions and policies in a way that varies with the country’s distance to the technological frontier $a$.

Equation (3) incorporates Gerschenkron’s “advantage of backwardness”\footnote{See Gerschenkron (1962).}, in the sense that the further the country is behind the global technology frontier (i.e., the smaller is $a_t$) the faster it will grow, owing to the frequency of implementation innovations. As in Gerschenkron’s analysis, the advantage arises from the fact that implementation innovations allow the country to make larger quality improvements the further it has fallen behind the frontier. As we shall see below, this is just one of the ways in which distance to the frontier can affect a country’s growth performance.

In addition, as stressed by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) [AAZ], growth equations like (3) make it quite natural to capture Gerschenkron’s idea of “appropriate institutions”. Suppose indeed that the institutions that favors implementation innovations (that is, that lead to firms emphasizing $\mu_m$ at the expense of $\mu_n$) are not the same as those that favor leading-edge innovations (that is, that encourage firms to focus on $\mu_n$): then, far from the frontier a country will maximize growth by setting up institutions that facilitate implementation, however as it catches up with the technological frontier, to sustain a high growth rate the
country will have to shift from implementation-enhancing institutions to innovation-enhancing institutions as the relative importance of $\mu_m$ for growth is also increasing. As formally shown in AAZ, failure to operate such a shift can prevent a country from catching up with the frontier level of per capita GDP, and Sapir et al (2003) argued that this failure largely explains why Europe stopped catching up with US per capita GDP since the mid 1970s.

How about growth rates? Suppose that the global frontier grows at the exogenous rate $\bar{\gamma}$. Then equation (3) implies that in the long run a country that engages in implementation investments (with $\mu_m > 0$) will ultimately converge to the same growth rate as the world technology frontier. That is, the relative gap $a_t$ that separates this economy from the technology frontier will converge asymptotically to the steady-state value:

$$\hat{a} = \frac{\mu_m}{\bar{\gamma} + \mu_m - \mu_n (\gamma - 1)}$$

which is an increasing function of the domestic innovation rates and a decreasing function of the global productivity growth rate. The economic force underlying this convergence in growth rates is again Ger-schenkron’s advantage of backwardness, according to which a country that is growing slower than the frontier rate $\bar{\gamma}$, and which is therefore falling further behind the frontier, will therefore experience an increase in its growth rate.

Now, can we explain why, since the mid 1990s, the EU is growing at a lower rate than the US? A plausible story, which comes out naturally from the above discussion, is that the European economy caught up technologically to the US following WWII but then its growth began to slow down before the gap with the US had been closed, because its policies and institutions were not designed to optimize growth when close to the frontier. That by itself would have resulted in a growth rate that fell down to that of the US but no further. But then what happened was that the IT revolution resulted in a revival of $\bar{\gamma}$ in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since Europe was as not well placed as the US to benefit from this technological revolution the result was a reversal of Europe’s approach to the frontier, which accords with the Schumpeterian steady-state condition (4), and the fact that Europe is not adjusting its institutions in order to produce the growth maximizing innovation policy, acts as a delaying force on growth convergence towards the US.4

To conclude this section, let us contrast the Schumpeterian growth paradigm with the other branch of “innovation-based” growth models, the so-called product variety model by Romer (1990), according to which aggregate productivity is a function of the degree of product variety. In this model, innovation causes productivity growth in the product-variety paradigm by creating new, but not necessarily improved, varieties of products. This paradigm grew out of the new theory of international trade, and emphasized the technology spillovers according to which the productivity of resources devoted to developing new product varieties was greater the greater the variety of products that have already been developed. More formally, the product

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3Howitt (2000) shows how the global growth rate can be endogenized as a function of innovation rates in sectors and all countries.

4Endogenizing $\mu_m$ can also generate divergence in growth rates. For example, human capital constraints as in Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), or credit constraints as in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), make the equilibrium value of $\mu_m$ increasing in $a$, which turns the growth equation (3) into a non-linear equation. That $\mu_m$ be increasing in $a$ follows in turn from the assumption that the cost of innovating is proportional to the frontier technology level that is put in place by the innovation, (Ha and Howitt (2005) provide empirical support for this proportionality assumption.) whereas the firm’s investment is constrained to be proportional to current local productivity. Then, countries very far from the frontier and/or with very low degrees of financial development or of human capital will tend to grow in the long run at a rate which is strictly lower than the frontier growth rate $\bar{\gamma}$. However, our empirical analysis in this paper shows that this source of divergence does not apply to EU countries.
variety model starts from a Ethier-Dixit-Stiglitz production function of the form:

\[ Y_t = \sum_{0}^{N_t} K_{it}^\alpha \]

in which there are \( N_t \) different varieties of intermediate product. By symmetry, the aggregate capital stock \( K_t \) will be divided up evenly among the \( N_t \) existing varieties equally, which means we can re-express this production function as:

\[ Y_t = N_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^\alpha. \] (5)

According to (5), the degree of product variety \( N_t \) is the economy’s labor-augmenting productivity parameter, and its growth rate is the economy’s long-run growth rate of per-capita output. Product variety raises the economy’s production potential in this theory because it allows a given capital stock to be spread over a larger number of uses, each of which exhibits diminishing returns.

The driving force of long run growth in the product-variety paradigm is innovation, as in the Schumpeterian paradigm. In this case however innovations do not generate better intermediate products, just more of them. Also as in the Schumpeterian model, the equilibrium R&D investment and innovation rate result from a research arbitrage equation that equates the expected marginal payoff from engaging in R&D to the marginal opportunity cost of R&D. But the fact that there is just one kind of innovation, which always results in the same kind of new product, means that the product-variety model is limited in its ability to generate context-dependent growth, and is therefore of limited use for policy makers in Europe.

In particular, the theory makes it very difficult to talk about the notion of technology frontier and of a country’s distance to the frontier. Consequently, it has little to say about how the kinds of policies appropriate for promoting growth in countries near the world’s technology frontier may differ from those appropriate in technological laggards, and thus to explain why Asia is growing fast with policies that depart from the Washington consensus, or why Europe has grown faster than the US during the first three decades after WWII but not thereafter.

In addition, nothing in this model implies an important role for exit and turnover of firms and workers; indeed increased exit in this model can do nothing but reduce the economy’s GDP, by reducing the variety variable \( N_t \) that uniquely determines aggregate productivity according to the production function (5). As we shall argue in more details in the next section, these latter implications of the product variety model are inconsistent with an increasing number of recent studies demonstrating that labor and product market mobility are key elements of a growth-enhancing policy near the technological frontier.

3 Competition, entry and exit

As stressed by the Sapir report (see Sapir (2003)), competition policy in Europe has emphasized competition among incumbent firms, but paid insufficient attention to entry. Entry, as well as exit and turnover of firms, are more important in the United States than Europe. For example, 50% of new pharmaceutical products are introduced by firms that are less than 10 years old in the United States, versus only 10% in Europe. Similarly, 12 percent of the largest US firms by market capitalization at the end of the 1990s had been founded less than twenty years before, against only 4 per cent in Europe, and the difference between US and Europe turnover rates is much bigger if one considers the top 500 firms.

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That the higher entry costs and lower degree of turnover in Europe compared to the US are an important part of the explanation for the relatively disappointing European growth performance over the past decade has been shown in empirical work by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). In this section we first argue that the Schumpeterian paradigm is well suited to analyze the effects of entry and exit on innovation and growth. We then provide evidence that is consistent with the predictions of that paradigm and questions the other two models of endogenous growth.

The section is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses product market competition. Section 3.2 shows how the Schumpeterian paradigm can be used to analyze the effects of entry on innovation and growth, and contrasts the predictions delivered by this paradigm with those delivered by the other models of endogenous growth. Section 3.3 presents evidence supporting the Schumpeterian predictions. And Section 3.4 concludes.

### 3.1 Product-market competition among incumbents

Like the product variety model, the Schumpeterian growth paradigm embodies the “appropriability” effect, by which stricter competition policy may reduce growth by reducing the post-innovation rents that reward a successful innovator. However, the Schumpeterian paradigm naturally generates a counteracting “escape competition” effect. That is, in duopoly industries where the two firms have similar technological capabilities, although more intense competition lowers the post-innovation rents of an innovating firm, nevertheless it may lower the rents of a non-innovating firm by even more. In such an industry, more competition thus raises the incremental profits that a firm earns by innovating; in effect, innovation is a means by which the firm can break away from the constraints of intense competition with a close technological rival. Less intense competition, on the other hand, would make it easier for the firm to earn profits without having to incur the expense of innovating. Thus more intense competition in “neck-and-neck” industries can lead to higher innovation rates and hence faster productivity growth.

This escape-competition effect is likely to be dominated by the appropriability effect in unlevelled industries, where one firm has a large technological lead over its rival. The leader in such an industry will not be under intense pressure to innovate regardless of the nature of competition policy. And the laggard’s incentive to innovate, and therefore to catch up with the leader, may be blunted by a more vigorous anti-trust policy whose main effect would be to reduce the post-innovation profit that the firm can earn from catching up. Thus one important prediction of the Schumpeterian paradigm is that product market competition should have a more positive effect on innovation and productivity growth in industries where firms are more neck-and-neck. In Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) this prediction is tested by examining patenting rates within a panel of UK manufacturing firms over the period 1973-1992, and the results are summarized in Figure 1.

**Figure 1 Below**

The figure shows that if we restrict the set of industries to those above the median degree of neck-and-neckness, the upward sloping part of the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation is steeper than we consider the whole sample of industries.\(^6\)

\(^6\)The inverted-U feature is explained by the fact that at high degrees of competition, the incentive to escape competition is so intense among neck-and-neck firms that industries quickly leave that state, resulting in a steady-state distribution with very few industries being neck-and-neck; thus, the overall effect of competition is the negative appropriability effect at work in unlevelled industries; at low degrees of competition however the incentive to escape competition is so blunted that industries tend to remain for a long period in the neck-and-neck state, resulting in a steady-state distribution with most industries being neck-and-neck, so that the overall effect of competition is the escape-competition effect that dominates in those industries. The
The no-steady-state aspects of the above theory may have something to say about the recent slowdown of European growth relative to the US. That is, suppose we think of the typical European industry as involving competition between a European and a US firm. As others have observed, product-market competition tends to be less intense in the Europe than in the US. But during the immediate post-WWII period the European firms were predominantly the technological laggards, whose innovation rates would have been diminished by very intense competition. Thus for some time the relatively non-competitive nature of Europe was favorable to innovation and productivity-growth by European firms. However, as Europe approached closer to the global technological frontier, more and more industries involved neck-and-neck competition between a European firm and its US counterpart, and it is in this situation where European innovation and growth were dampened by its non-competitive environment.

What we have here is an example of a phenomenon we explore in more detail in the following section, namely that policies which promote rapid economic growth when the economy is far from the world technology frontier may work in the opposite direction once the country has approached close to the frontier. As we shall see, this general phenomenon, which arises naturally in a Schumpeterian setting, applies to all three of the policy areas explored in this address.

Could one easily extend the product variety model in order to generate the equivalent of our escape competition effect? Our answer is no, based on the following considerations. First, the escape competition effect requires that innovations be performed by incumbent firms with positive pre-innovation rents that decrease more rapidly than post-innovation rents with competition. However, the essence of the product variety model is that growth results from the entry of new intermediate goods, and therefore by definition the innovators have pre-innovation rents equal to zero. Second, escaping competition in that framework would mean differentiating oneself more from other firms. However, the Dixit-Stiglitz specification used in that model requires all products to be equally differentiated from each other, to an extent measured (inversely) by the parameter $\alpha$, the same parameter that defines the intensity of competition between any two intermediate firms. In this framework with no quality improvement allowed, there is no means by which a firm can try to escape the effects of competition.

### 3.2 Entry in the Schumpeterian paradigm

Even more than competition among incumbents, Schumpeterian theory implies that entry, exit and turnover all have a positive effect on innovation and productivity growth, not only in the economy as a whole but also within incumbent firms. The idea here is that increased entry, and increased threat of entry, enhance innovation and productivity growth, not just because these are the direct result of quality-improving innovations from new entrants, but also because the threat of being driven out by a potential entrant gives incumbent firms an incentive to innovate in order to escape entry, through an effect that works much like the escape-competition effect described above. This “escape-entry” effect is especially strong for firms close to the work technology frontier. For firms further behind the frontier, the dominant effect of entry threat is a “discouragement” effect that works much like the Schumpeterian appropriability effect described above.

These effects can be understood in terms of the following simple model. Each sector $i$ is monopolized by an incumbent with technology parameter $A_{it}$. Each innovation raises $A_{it}$ by a constant factor $\gamma > 1$. The explicit micro structure of Schumpeterian theory implies that these same predictions concerning a country’s growth rate and innovation rate apply equally well to the growth rate and innovation rate of each industry within the country.

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7The model draws on the more formal analysis of Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2004) and Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2005a).
incumbent monopolist in sector $i$ earns profits equal to:

$$
\pi_{it} = \delta A_{it}.
$$

In every sector the probability of a potential entrant appearing is $p$, which is also our measure of entry threat. We focus on technologically advanced entry; accordingly, each potential entrant arrives with the leading-edge technology parameter $A_t$, which grows by the factor $\gamma$ with certainty each period. If the incumbent is also on the leading edge, with $A_{it} = A_t$, then we assume he can use a first-mover advantage to block entry and retain his monopoly. But if he is behind the leading edge, with $A_{it} < A_t$, then entry will occur, Bertrand competition will ensue, and the technologically dominated incumbent will be eliminated and replaced by the entrant.

The effect of entry threat on incumbent innovation will depend on the marginal benefit $v_{it}$ which the incumbent expects to receive from an innovation. Consider first an incumbent who was on the frontier last period. If he innovates then he will remain on the frontier, and hence will be immune to entry. His profit will then be $\delta A_t$. If he fails to innovate then with probability $p$ he will be eliminated by entry and earn zero profit, while with probability $1 - p$ he will survive as the incumbent earning a profit of $\delta A_{t-1}$. The expected marginal benefit of an innovation to this firm is the difference between the profit he will earn with certainty if he innovates and the expected profit he will earn if not:

$$
v_{it} = [\gamma - (1 - p)] \delta A_{t-1}.
$$

Since $v_{it}$ depends positively on the entry threat $p$, therefore an increase in entry threat will induce this incumbent to spend more on innovating and hence to innovate with a larger probability. Intuitively, a firm close to the frontier responds to increased entry threat by innovating more in order to escape the threat.

Next consider an incumbent who was behind the frontier last period, and who will therefore remain behind the frontier even if he manages to innovate, since the frontier will also advance by the factor $\gamma$. For this firm, profits will be zero if entry occurs, whether he innovates or not, because he cannot catch up with the frontier. Thus his expected marginal benefit of an innovation will be:

$$
v_{it} = (1 - p) (\gamma - 1) \delta A_{i,t-1}.
$$

That is, the expected benefit is a profit gain that will be realized with probability $(1 - p)$, the probability that no potential entrant shows up. Since in this case $v_{it}$ depends negatively on the entry threat $p$, therefore an increase in entry threat will induce the firm to spend less on innovating and hence to innovate with a lower probability. Intuitively, the firm that starts far behind the frontier is discouraged from innovating as much by an increased entry threat because he is unable to prevent the entrant from destroying the value of his innovation.

The theory thus generates the following predictions:

1. Entry and entry threat enhance innovation and productivity growth among incumbents in sectors or countries that are initially close to the technological frontier, as the escape entry effect dominates in that case;

2. Entry and entry threat reduce innovation and productivity growth among incumbents in sectors or countries that are far below the frontier, as the discouragement effect dominates in that case.
3. Entry and entry threat enhance average productivity growth among incumbent firms when the threat has exceeded some threshold, but reduce average productivity growth among incumbents below that threshold, because as the probability measuring the threat approaches unity then almost all incumbents will be on the frontier, having either innovated last period or entered last period, and firms near the frontier respond to a further increase in \( p \) by innovating more frequently.

4. Entry (and therefore, turnover) is growth-enhancing overall in the short run,\(^8\) because even in those sectors where incumbent innovation is discouraged by the threat of entry the entrants themselves will raise productivity by implementing a frontier technology.

### 3.3 Evidence

The results of this simple extension of Schumpeterian growth theory have been corroborated by a variety of empirical findings. First, ABGHP (2005) investigate the effects of entry threat on TFP growth of UK manufacturing establishments, using panel data with over 32,000 annual observations of firms in 166 different 4-digit industries over the 1980-93 period. They estimate the equation:

\[
Y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta E_{jt} + \eta_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}
\]  

(6)

where \( Y_{ijt} \) is TFP growth in firm \( i \), industry \( j \), year \( t \), \( \eta \) and \( \tau \) are fixed establishment and year effects, and \( E_{jt} \) is the industry entry rate, measured by the change in the share of UK industry employment in foreign-owned plants. (For the UK foreign entrants are typically US entrants, close to the technology frontier, as in the theory, whereas domestic entrants are typically smaller, less efficient, and less likely to survive.) Column (1) of Table 1 below shows that OLS estimation produces a significant positive estimate of \( \beta \), indicating that entry-threat, as proxied by \( E_{jt} \), tends to increase the average productivity growth of incumbents. Column (2) shows that this estimate is largely unaffected by controlling for the establishment’s sample average productivity growth. Columns (3) and (4) are IV estimates of the equations in the first two columns respectively, where the instruments for entry are cross-industry and time series variation in UK product market regulation triggered by the introduction of the EU Single Market Program and US R&D intensity in the industry. The IV estimates show an even stronger positive effect of entry threat on incumbent productivity growth.

\[
TABLE 1 HERE
\]

This entry effect is economically as well as statistically significant. For example, according to column 3, a one-standard-deviation increase in the entry variable would raise the average incumbent’s TFP growth rate by 1.3 percentage points.

In order to verify that this effect of entry on incumbent productivity growth is a result of increased incumbent innovation rather than technology spillover from, or copying of, the superior technologies brought in by the entrants, ABGHP (2004) estimate equation (6) using a patent count rather than productivity growth as the dependent variable. Specifically, using a panel involving over 1000 annual observations of 176 UK firms in 60 different 3-digit industries over the 1987-93 period, they defined \( Y_{ijt} \) as the log of the number of patents successfully applied for by firm \( i \) in the United States, and \( E_{jt} \) as the employment weighted share of new foreign-owned firms in the industry. An OLS regression using not just firm and year dummies but also

\[^8\]In the long run, the economy will grow at the same rate \( \gamma - 1 \) as the exogenous world technology frontier.
controls for the firm’s pre-sample patent stock and a dummy for that stock being positive, produces a highly significantly positive estimate of $\beta$. The sign and significance of the estimate is robust to the inclusion of controls for import penetration, competition, and distance to the frontier $D_{jt}$, where the latter is measured by the labor-productivity in the corresponding US industry relative to the UK industry. Its significance is enhanced by instrumenting for entry as in the above growth regression.

ABGHP (2005) provide direct evidence that the escape competition is stronger for industries that are closer to the frontier. Specifically, when the interaction term $E_{jt} \cdot D_{jt}$ is added to the equation, its coefficient is highly significantly negative in all estimations. A one-standard deviation increase in the entry variable above its sample mean would reduce the estimated number of patents by 10.8% in an industry far from the frontier (at the 90th percentile of $D_{jt}$) and would increase the estimated number by 42.6% in an industry near the frontier (at the 10th percentile). Thus it seems that the positive effect of entry threat on incumbent productivity growth in Europe is indeed much larger now than it was immediately after WWII, and that the relative neglect of entry implications of competition policy is having an increasingly detrimental effect on European productivity growth.

That regulatory changes affect growth is already suggested by regressions using cross-OECD panel data. Specifically, Table 2 below reports the results of regressing the growth rate of per-capita GDP on an index of product market liberalization and other macroeconomic controls, using aggregate data from OECD countries. The positive coefficient on product market liberalization suggests that freer entry promotes growth among OECD countries.

**TABLE 2 HERE**

While the above results are consistent with the Schumpeterian emphasis on quality-improving innovations, they are hard to reconcile with the product-variety model of Romer (1990). First, as already pointed out above, it is not clear how one would even interpret the empirical results concerning distance to the frontier in a horizontal innovation model (since in that framework there are no productivity differences between industries). Second, it is hard to see how the threat of entry or competition could promote innovation among incumbents. This section describes a variety of additional empirical findings indicating that quality improvement and creative destruction are indeed a necessary part of the mechanism by which entry promotes growth.

First, in ongoing work with Pol Antras and Susanne Prantl, we have combined UK establishment-level panel data with the input-output table to estimate the effect on TFP growth arising from growth in high-quality input in upstream industries, and also from exit of obsolete input-producing firms in upstream industries. Specifically, we take a panel of 23,886 annual observations on more than 5,000 plants in 180 4-digit industries between 1987 and 1993, together with the 1984 UK input-output table, to estimate an equation of the form:

$$g_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta \cdot q_{jt-1} + \gamma \cdot x_{jt-1} + \delta \cdot Z_{ijt-1} + \eta_i + \phi_j + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

where $g_{ijt}$ is the TFP growth rate of firm $i$ in industry $j$. The first regressor, $q_{jt-1}$, reflects upstream foreign entry, whereas the second regressor $x_{jt-1}$ is a measure of exit of obsolete upstream input-producing firms. Establishment, industry and year effects are included, along with the other controls in $Z_{ijt-1}$, including a measure of the plant’s market share.

The result of this estimation is a significant positive effect of both upstream quality improvement and upstream input-production exit. These results are robust to taking potential endogeneity into account by
applying an instrumental variable approach, using instruments similar to those of ABGHP (2005) described above. The effects are particularly strong for plants that use more intermediate inputs; i.e., plants with a share of intermediate product use above the sample median. Altogether, the results we find are consistent with the view that quality-improving innovation is an important source of growth. The results are however not consistent with the horizontal innovation model, in which there should be nothing special about the entry of foreign firms, and according to which the exit of upstream firms should if anything reduce growth by reducing the variety of inputs being used in the industry.

3.4 Taking stock

Overall, the empirical evidence strongly supports the main prediction of the Schumpeterian model, namely that: (i) entry and delicensing have a more positive effect on growth in sectors or countries that are closer to the technological frontier, but have a less positive effect on sectors or countries that lie far below the frontier; (ii) that exit can have a positive effect on productivity growth in downstream industries because it replaces less efficient input producers by more efficient ones.

Second, the analysis and empirical findings reported here have important policy implications. In particular, they go directly against the belief that national or European “champions” are best placed to innovate at the frontier, or that these should be put in charge of selecting new research projects for public funding, as recently proposed by Jean-Louis Beffa of Saint-Gobain in a report to President Chirac. Instead, as we recommended in Sapir et al (2003), any product market regulation, including the Single Market legislation, should be reexamined for its effects on new entry. In the past competition policy in Europe has been used to a large extent as a mechanism to increase openness and integration (in particular through the design and enforcement of the dominance criterion), not so much competition per se, and if it has affected competition it is mainly by policing anti-competitive behavior among incumbent firms, while paying little attention to entry. The Schumpeterian model in this section, and the evidence supporting it, suggest that although disregarding entry was no big deal during the thirty years immediately after WWII when Europe was still far behind the US and catching up with it, nevertheless now that Europe has come close to the world technology frontier this relative neglect of entry considerations is having an increasingly depressing effect on European growth.

4 Education

Is the European education system growth-maximizing? A first look at the US versus the EU in 1999-2000 shows that 37.3% of the U.S. population aged 25-64 have completed a higher education degree, against only 23.8% of the EU population. This educational attainment comparison is mirrored by that on tertiary education expenditure, with the US devoting 3% of its GDP to tertiary education versus only 1.4% in the EU. Is this European deficit in tertiary education investment a big deal for growth?

4.1 Mankiw-Romer-Weil and Lucas

Once again, our first reflex is to get back to the literature on education and growth. First, to models based on capital accumulation. There, the neo-classical reference is Mankiw-Romer-Weil (1992) [MRW], and the AK reference is the celebrated article by Lucas (1988). Both papers emphasize human capital accumulation as a source of growth. In MRW, which is an augmented version of the Solow model with human capital as
an additional accumulating factor of production, human capital accumulation slows down the convergence to the steady-state by counteracting the effects of decreasing returns to physical capital accumulation. In Lucas, instead, the assumption that human capital accumulates at a speed proportional to the existing stock of human capital, leads a positive long-run growth rate. Whether on the transition path to the steady-state (in MRW) or in steady-state (in Lucas), the rate of growth depends upon the rate of accumulation of human capital, not upon the stock of human capital. Moreover, these capital accumulation-based models do not distinguish between primary/secondary and tertiary education: the two are perfect substitutes in these models. Thus, if we believe these models, it is not a problem if the US spend more than Europe in higher education, as long as total spending and attainment in education as a whole have not increased faster in the US than in Europe. And indeed they have not done so over the past decade.

Does this mean that education policy is not an issue, or rather that we should not fully believe in these models? What tilts us more towards the latter is first the work by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) who argued, based on cross-country regressions over the 1965-1985 period, that human capital accumulation (where human capital is measured by school enrollment) was not significantly correlated with growth, whereas human capital stocks were. Another source of scepticism is the finding by Ha and Howitt (2005) that the trend growth rate of the number of R&D workers in the US has gone down over past 50 years, whereas the trend rate of productivity growth has not.

4.2 Nelson-Phelps and the Schumpeterian approach

More than just questioning the capital accumulation approach to education and growth, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) provided support to the Schumpeterian approach by resurrecting the simple model by Nelson and Phelps (1966). Nelson and Phelps did not have a model of endogenous growth with endogenous R&D and innovation, but they were already thinking of growth as being generated by productivity-improving adaptations, whose diffusion across the industry would depend upon the stock of human capital. More formally, a globalized version of Nelson and Phelps would picture a world economy in which, in any given country, productivity grows according to an equation of the form:

$$\dot{A} = f(h)(\bar{A} - A),$$

where again $\bar{A}$ denotes the frontier technology (itself growing over time at some exogenous rate), and $h$ is the current stock of human capital in the country (for example measured by the fraction of workers in the labor force with a college degree). A higher stock of human capital would thus foster growth by making it easier for a country to catch up with the frontier technology. Benhabib and Spiegel tested a slightly augmented version of the Nelson-Phelps in which human capital does not only facilitate the adaptation to more advanced technologies, but also makes it easier to innovate at the frontier, according to a dynamic equation of the form:

$$\dot{A} = f(h)(\bar{A} - A) + g(h)\gamma A,$$

where the second term capture the innovation component of growth.

Using cross country-regressions of the increase in the log of per capita GDP over the period 1965-1985 as a linear function of the sum of logs of human capital stocks over all the years between 1965 and 1985, Benhabib and Spiegel found a significantly positive correlation between the two, which in turn was evidence that the rate of productivity growth is also positively correlated with the stock of human capital. Moreover, BS found a larger correlation for countries further below the world technology frontier, which would hint
at the catch-up component of growth being the dominant one. Thus, more than the rate of human capital accumulation, it is its stock that matters for growth. Does this help us understand the comparison between Europe and the US?

Unfortunately, more recent work by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) would temper our optimism. Using panel data over 110 countries between 1960 and 1990, choosing the number of years in education instead of the logarithm of that number to measure human capital\(^9\), and correcting for measurement errors, Krueger and Lindahl would still find a positive correlation between growth and the level of human capital stocks (although they also found a positive correlation between growth and the rate of accumulation of human capital), however the significance of the correlation between growth and human capital stocks would disappear when restricting the regression to OECD countries.

4.3 Schumpeter meets Gerschenkron

Should we conclude from Krueger and Lindahl that education only matters for catching-up but not for innovating at the frontier and that, consequently, education is not an area which Europe needs to reform in order to resume growing at a rate at least equal to that of the US? The new hint at that point came from Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002)’s idea on appropriate institutions and economic growth, which we already spelled out in Section 2 above.\(^{10}\) As in Benhabib and Spiegel, productivity growth in AAZ can be generated either by implementing (or imitating) the frontier technology \(\mu_m\) or by innovating on top of past technologies \(\mu_n\), and obviously the relative importance of innovation increases as a country or region moves closer to the technology frontier. However, and this is where we use AAZ and thereby depart from Benhabib and Spiegel, different types of education spending lie behind imitation and innovation activities. In particular, higher education investment should have a bigger effect on a country’s ability to make leading-edge innovations, whereas primary and secondary education are more likely to make a difference in terms of the country’s ability to implement existing (frontier) technologies.

Now, what are the potential implications of this approach for education policy, and is there something to learn from the comparison between Europe and the US given the disappointing news of Krueger and Lindahl from cross-OECD country regressions? The remaining part of the section is based on work by Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004) [VAM], and current work by Aghion, Boustan, Hoëxby and Vandenbussche (2005) [ABHV]. The starting point of these two papers is that, in contrast to the Nelson-Phelps or Benhabib-Spiegel models, human capital does not affect innovation and imitation uniformly: more specifically, primary/secondary education tends to produce imitators, whereas tertiary (especially graduate) education is more likely to produce innovators. This realistic assumption, in turn, leads to the prediction that, as a country moves closer to technological frontier, tertiary education should become increasingly important for growth compared to primary/secondary education (all measured in stocks).

VAM confront this prediction with cross-country panel evidence on higher education, distance to frontier, distance to the technology frontier, and primary/secondary education. Their results indicate that tertiary education has a stronger positive effect on growth than primary/secondary education, consistent with the theoretical predictions of AAZ. However, the magnitude of the effect varies across countries, with higher education having a stronger effect in countries with higher technological capabilities.

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\(^9\)This change was in turn motivated by the so-called Mincerian approach to human capital, whereby the value of one more year in schooling is measured by the wage increase that is foregone by the individual who chooses to study during that year instead of working. This amounts to measuring the value of a human capital stock by the log of the current wage rate earned by an individual. And that log was shown by Mincer to be positively correlated to the number of years spend at school by the individual, after estimating an equation of the form: 
\[ \ln w = a_0 + a_1 n. \]

The Mincerian approach can itself be criticized, however, for: (i) assuming perfectly competitive labor markets; (ii) ignoring the role of schools as selection devices; (iii) ignoring interpersonal and intertemporal knowledge externalities.

\(^{10}\)That hint in turn provided the backbone for the Sapir Report and its application to education lead to a report on “Education and Growth” for the French Conseil d’Analyse Economique.
and productivity growth. ABHV tests the theory on cross-US state data. Each approach has its pros and cons. Cross US-state analysis uses a much richer data set and also very good instruments for higher and lower education spending. However, a serious analysis of the growth impact of education spending across US states, must take into account an additional element not considered in previous models, namely the effects on the migration of skilled labor across states at different levels of technological development. On the other hand, cross-country analysis can safely ignore the migration, however the data are sparse and the instruments for educational spending are weak (they mainly consists of lagged spending). In the remaining part of the section we shall consider the two pieces of empirical analysis in turn.

VAM consider a panel data set of 22 OECD countries over the period 1960-2000, which they subdivide into five year subperiods. Output and investment data are drawn from Penn World Tables 6.1 (2002) and human capital data from Barro-Lee (2000). The Barro-Lee data indicate the fraction of a country’s population that has reached a certain level of schooling at intervals of five years, so they use the fraction that has received some higher education together with their measure of TFP (constructed assuming a constant labor share of .65 across country) to perform the following regression:

\[ g_{jt} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{dist}_{j,t-1} + \alpha_2 \Lambda_{j,t} + \alpha_3 (\text{dist}_{j,t-1} \times \Lambda_{j,t}) + v_j + u_{j,t}, \]

where \( g_{jt} \) is country \( j \)'s growth rate over a five year period, \( \text{dist}_{j,t-1} \) is country \( j \)'s closeness to the technological frontier at \( t-1 \) (i.e. 5 years before), \( \Lambda_{j,t} \) is the fraction of the working age population with some higher education and \( v_j \) is a country's fixed effect. The closeness and human capital variables are instrumented with their values at \( t-2 \) and the equation is estimated in differences to eliminate the fixed effect. Before controlling for country fixed effects, VAM obtain a statistically significant coefficient of \(-1.87\) for the human capital variable, and a statistically significant coefficient of \(2.37\) for the interaction variable, indicating that indeed higher education matters more as a country gets closer to the frontier. Controlling for country fixed effects removes the significance of the coefficients, however this significance is restored once country are regrouped into subregions and country fixed effects are replaced by group fixed effects. This, in turn suggests that cross-country data on only 22 countries, are too sparse for significant regression results to survive when we control for country fixed effects.

To see how this result translates in terms of the effect of an additional year of schooling of higher education, they perform the following regression in logs:

\[ g'_{jt} = \alpha'_0 + \alpha'_1 \text{dist}'_{j,t-1} + \alpha'_2 N_{j,t} + \alpha'_3 (\text{dist}'_{j,t-1} \times N_{j,t}) + v'_j + u'_{j,t}, \]

where this time \( \text{dist}'_{j,t-1} \) is the log of the closeness to the technological frontier and \( N_{j,t} \) is the average number of years of higher education of the population. The econometric technique employed is the same as before. Before controlling for country fixed effects, VAM find the coefficient of the number of years to be \(0.105\) and of little significance, but the coefficient of the interaction variable to be equal to \(0.368\) and significant. This result again demonstrates that it is more important to expand years of higher education close to the technological frontier.

ABHV test the same theory on cross-US state data instead of cross-country data. As mentioned above, one potential problem when moving from cross-country to cross-region data, is that educational policy should affect migration flows across regions more than it affects migration flows across countries. Thus a suitable model of education and growth across regions within a same country, ought to include an additional equation describing how migration flows varies for example with the wage differential between a particular
state and the state currently at the technological frontier. Introducing the possibility of migration reinforces the positive interaction between closeness to the frontier and higher education. Namely, in addition to the Rybczynski effect described above, investing in higher education in a state that is far from the technological frontier, would contribute all the less to growth in that state that the newly skilled workers would migrate to a more frontier state where productivity and therefore wages are higher.

Any regression with growth on the left-hand-side and education on the right-hand-side, raises an obvious endogeneity problem, best emphasized by Bils and Klenow (2000). Here, as in the above cross-country panel regressions, the endogeneity problem can be stated as follows: If states or countries choose their composition of education spending according to the model, then we should see the composition of educational investments being highly correlated with technology and productivity, and therefore the regressions would say nothing about causality.

However, the great advantage of moving from cross-country to cross-state analysis, is that we have access to a natural source of exogenous mistakes in education investment, namely political economy considerations which may lead the congress or other federal instances to misallocate the funding to higher education across states. For example, because it has a representative on a congressional commission for higher education, a far-from-the-frontier state may end up mistakenly receiving excessive funding for research-related education. Conversely, because of local political economy considerations, a close-to-the-frontier state may end up mistakenly focusing its investment in primary education, neglecting higher education.

In other words, political economy considerations and the politicians’s ability and incentive to deliver “porks” to their constituencies, provide a natural source of instruments that predict states’ tendencies to make exogenous mistakes when investing in education.

Then, using annual panel data over the period 1970 - 2000, ABHV perform a two-stage procedure whereby: (i) in first-stage regressions, the various kinds of educational spending are regressed over their respective instruments; (ii) the growth rate in each state and year, is regressed over the instruments for the various kinds of educational spending, the state’s proximity to the frontier, and the interaction between the two, controlling for state and year fixed effects.

We refer our readers to ABHV (2005) for the detailed regression results, which yield the following conclusions. First, in contrast to our previous cross-country analysis, here the correlations remain significant even after controlling for state fixed effects without having to regroup the country dummies. Second, the above instruments are very strong, with an F-Statistics of more than 10 for the joint significance of the two dummies for senator and house representative on the corresponding appropriation committees as determinants of research education spending. For example, every additional representative on the House Appropriation committee increases the expenditure on research-type education by $597 per cohort member which is considerable. Now, turning to the second-stage regressions, ABHV find that an additional $1000 per person in research education spending, raises the state’s per-employee growth rate by .27% if the state is at the frontier (with a close to 1), whereas it raises it by only 0.09% if the state is far from the frontier (with a close to .3). More generally, the closer a state gets to the technological frontier, the more growth-enhancing it becomes to invest in higher education and the less growth-enhancing it becomes to emphasize lower education.

4.4 Taking stock

To summarize our discussion in this section: first, capital accumulation-based models have little to say about education policy, particularly with regard to the increasing growth gap between Europe and the US. Second, Schumpeterian models that emphasize the interplay between human capital stocks and the innovation
process, have more potential for delivering policy recommendations, yet when looking at educational spending as a whole there is not much that be said from looking at cross-OECD comparisons. However, once we distinguish between imitation and frontier innovation and map these two sources of productivity growth to different segments of the education system, then we can come up with relevant policy recommendations for regions like Europe that have moved closer to the frontier and yet are maintaining very low levels of higher education spending compared to the US. The above regressions suggest indeed that putting the emphasis on primary/secondary education was fine as long as Europe was technologically far from the US and therefore relying more on imitation as a main source of growth, but that now that the growth potential of imitation is wearing out, it becomes more urgent to invest more in higher education in order to foster innovation. In fact, the cross-country (cross-OECD) analysis in VAM shows the additional result that if we include a dummy for 1985 (equal to zero before 1985 and to one after) in the regressions, and interact that dummy with all the right-hand-side terms in the regression, one finds that after 1985, the interaction between higher education investment and the proximity to the technological frontier, becomes insignificant: this, in turn indicates that on top of the above consideration, something happened during the 1980s (globalization and/or the IT revolution?) that would make it more growth-enhancing for all OECD countries to shift their emphasis higher education.

5 Macropolicy

There is currently a debate on the conduct of macroeconomic policy in the Euro area. In a nutshell, it has been noticed that structural budget deficits and short-term interest rates fluctuate much less over the cycle in the EMU zone than in the US and the UK, and some policy makers have raised the concern that this in turn may inhibit growth in the Euro area. Are those concerns at all justified?

5.1 The common wisdom and the Schumpeterian view

Mainstream macroeconomists would answer negatively to this question. Indeed, there is this common prejudice in macroeconomics, that there is a perfect dichotomy between, on the one hand macroeconomic policy (budget deficit, taxation, money supply) taken to affect primarily the short-run and whose primary aim is to stabilize the economy; and on the other hand, long-run economic growth, which is either taken to be exogenous or to depend only upon structural characteristics of the economy (property right enforcement, market structure, market mobility and so forth). The only link between macropolicy and long-run growth that most policy makers believe in, is that growth requires macroeconomic stability everything else remaining equal.

However, more Schumpeterian growth economists would disagree with that view. According to Schumpeter, recessions provide a cleansing mechanism for correcting organizational inefficiencies and for encouraging firms to reorganize, innovate or reallocate to new markets. The cleansing effect of recessions is also to eliminate those firms that are unable to reorganize or innovate. Schumpeter would summarize that view as follows; “[Recessions] are but temporary. They are means to reconstruct each time the economic system on a more efficient plan”. Now, if firms could always borrow enough funds to either reorganize their activities or move to new activities and markets, and the same was true for workers trying to relocate from one job to another, the best would be to recommend that governments do not intervene over the business cycle, and instead let markets operate.

However, as emphasized by Aghion-Angeletos-Banerjee-Manova (2006), things become quite different when credit market imperfections prevent firms from innovating and reorganizing in recessions. In particular,
suppose that firms can choose between short-run capital investment and long-term R&D investment (this choice amounts to a research arbitrage condition). Innovating requires that firms survive short-run liquidity shocks (R&D is a long-term investment) and that to cover liquidity costs firms can rely only on their short-run earnings plus borrowing. Suppose in addition that growth is driven by innovations, with the growth rate of knowledge (or average productivity) being proportional to the flow of innovating firms in the economy. Absent credit constraints, and provided the value of innovation is sufficiently high, volatility will not affect innovation and growth as firms can always borrow up to the net present value of their future earnings in order to cover the short-run liquidity costs. But, now, suppose that the borrowing capacity of firms is proportional to their current earnings (the factor of proportionality is what we refer to as the credit multiplier, with a higher multiplier reflecting a higher degree of financial development in the economy). In a recession, current earnings are reduced, and therefore so is the firms’ ability to borrow in order to innovate. This, in turn implies that the lower financial development, the more the anticipation of recessions will discourage R&D investments if those are decided before firms know the realization of the aggregate shock \(^{11}\) (since firms anticipate that with higher probability, their R&D investment will not pay out in the long-run as it will not survive the liquidity shock).

Based on cross-country panel data over the period 1960-2000, AABM show that the interaction term between financial development and volatility is indeed significantly positive. In theory, one could imagine a countering effect of volatility on growth, namely that higher volatility also means higher profits in booms, and therefore a possibly higher ability for firms to innovate during booms; however the regressions in AABM, Ramey and Ramey (1995), or below, all suggest that this latter effect is of second order.

### 5.2 The effects of countercyclical macropolicies on growth

Having shown that macroeconomic volatility tends to be more harmful to growth the lower the level of financial development, a natural conjecture is that the tighter the credit constraints faced by firms, the greater the scope for appropriate government intervention in particular to reduce the costs that negative liquidity shocks impose on credit-constrained firms. That government intervention might increase aggregate efficiency in an economy subject to credit constraints and aggregate shocks, has already been pointed for example by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). However this point has never been formally made in the context of a growth model, nor have its potential empirical and policy implications been explored so far. This subsection reports a first attempt\(^{12}\) at filling this gap, more precisely by analyzing the interplay between financial development and the growth effects of different types of cyclical macropolicies.

To the extent that, in an economy with tight credit constraints, the occurrence of a recession forces a number of firms to cut on innovative investments in order to survive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, a natural idea is that a countercyclical budgetary may foster innovation and growth by reducing the negative consequences of a recession (or a bad aggregate shock) on firms’ innovative investments. For example, the government may decide to increase the volume of its public investments, thereby fostering the demand for private firms’ products. Or the government may choose to directly increase its subsidies to private enterprises, thereby increasing their liquidity holdings and thus making it easier for them to face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks without having to sacrifice R&D or other types of longer-term growth-enhancing investments. From our analysis in the previous subsection, a natural prediction is that the lower the level of financial

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\(^{11}\) See Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2005) for the case where investment composition is decided after the realization of the aggregate shock \(a_t\).

\(^{12}\) The material in this subsection is drawn from current work by Aghion, Barro and Marinescu on cyclical budgetary policies and productivity growth.
development, that is, the tighter the credit constraints faced by firms, the more growth-enhancing such countercyclical policies should be.

Current work by Aghion and Marinescu (2006) [AM], analyzes the effects of (counter)cyclical budgetary policies on growth, using annual panel data on 17 OECD countries over the period 1965-2001; in particular, they restrict their analysis to a subset of “reasonable” countries for which Easterly (2005) would predict no effect of policy! Then, AM perform two-stage least-square regressions where:

1. The first stage regressions estimate, for each year, the correlations between: (i) on the left-hand side of the first-stage equation, variables such as: government debt, primary budget deficit, government investment, government consumption, defense spending, social security spending, direct subsidies to private enterprises; (ii) on the right-hand side of the first-stage equation: (a) the current output gap (measured by the difference between the real GDP and the maximum potential GDP, that is the GDP at minimum level of non-inflationary employment for given capital stock; (b) the current gap in government expenditures (measured by the deviation of government expenditure to its trend); and the lagged public debt to GDP ratio (which reflects the share of public spending used to meet the outstanding public debt obligations).

2. The second stage regressions estimate, the annual growth rate of per capita GDP (left-hand side variable) as a function of: (i) the lagged value of the cyclicity coefficient obtained from the first stage regression, which we denote by \(lcycl\); (ii) lagged financial development, \(lpc\), which we measure once again by the ratio of private credit to GDP; (iii) the interaction \(lcycl\_lpc\) between these two variables. The prediction is that the coefficient on \(lcycl\) should be negative (a procyclical budgetary policy is bad for growth in a country with no credit at all) whereas the interaction coefficient on \(lcycl\_lpc\) should be positive (a procyclical budgetary policy is less detrimental to growth, the higher the level of financial development).

The second-stage results with regard to the primary deficit show that a more procyclical primary deficit is detrimental to growth and the more so the lower the level of financial development. In particular, if public debt growth in the EMU zone were to become as countercyclical as in the US, the EMU zone would grow at 0.7% more per year than it currently does. Moreover, Tables 1 and 2 below suggest that it is the investment part of government spending that drives this positive effect of budget countercyclicity.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Tables 1 and 2 Here}
\end{table}

So far, we have concentrated on budgetary policy. But one could as well perform similar exercises with variables such as the M2/GDP ratio also used by Easterly (2005) or short-term real interest rates which are also linked to monetary policy. Unlike for budgetary variables, the coefficients are not very significant except in the regression where one controls for linear time trends; the regression where one controls for year fixed effects shows an interaction coefficient which is significant at the 15%. Thus there is something to having a countercyclical M2/GDP ratio at lower levels of financial development, but nothing as significant as the effect of countercyclical government investment for example.

5.3 Back to Europe versus the US

A natural conclusion from the analysis in this subsection, is that Europe should have budgetary (and to a lesser extent, monetary) policies that are more countercyclical, or at least as much countercyclical, than that
in the US given that the US are more financially developed than the EU. Indeed, the ratio of private credit to GDP in the EU is equal 0.76 against 1.32 in the US, and this difference abstracts from differences in stock market and venture capital market development, both markets are also far more developed in the US than in the EU. However, as shown in Figure 3 below, both the structural deficit and the real interest rates vary much less over time in the Eurozone than in the US. Our analysis suggests that the absence of an active (or reactive) macropolicy in the Eurozone is a potential source of growth deficit in this region.

FIGURE 3 HERE

6 Conclusion

This paper has argued that a more active competition and entry policy, a bigger emphasis on higher education and a more proactive macroeconomic policy over the cycle, could all contribute to boost growth in Western Europe. As usual the devil lies in the details, and a necessary next step is to look at more specific policy instruments and for each instrument calculate a ratio of the additional growth potential associated with this instrument with respect to the cost of implementing the corresponding policy. This in turn would enable us to "rank" the reforms, that is, to get a more precise view as to what should be undertaken first, or as to which reforms should be implemented jointly because of complementarities in their growth impacts.
References


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### Table 1: Public Investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No year effects</th>
<th>Linear time trend</th>
<th>Year fixed effects</th>
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<td>Lag(private credit / GDP)</td>
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<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.012</td>
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<td>Lag(private credit / GDP)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.035)**</td>
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<td>-0.016</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.019)**</td>
<td>(0.021)*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.975)**</td>
<td>(0.115)*</td>
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<td>453</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All regressions include country fixed effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

### Table 2: Government Consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No year effects</th>
<th>Linear time trend</th>
<th>Year fixed effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lag(procyclicality of government consumption)</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag(private credit / GDP)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag(procyclicality of government consumption*private credit / GDP)</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.013)**</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-2.101</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)**</td>
<td>(1.000)**</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All regressions include country fixed effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%